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Abstract Most theories of lie detection assume that lying
increases cognitive load, resulting in longer response latencies
during questioning. However, the studies supporting this the-
ory are typically laboratory-based, in settings with no specific
validity in security contexts. Consequently, using virtual real-
ity (VR), we investigated how response latencies were influ-
enced in an ecologically valid environment of interest to se-
curity professionals. In a highly realistic airport security ter-
minal presented in VR, a security officer asked participants
yes/no questions about their belongings. We found that liars
actually responded more quickly to questions on which they
were lying than to questions on which they were telling the
truth. A control group, who answered the same questions but
were not lying, answered equally quickly for all questions.We
argue that this decrease in response time is possibly an uncon-
scious reaction to questions on which individuals must answer
deceptively. These results call into question the generalizabil-
ity of previous research and highlight the importance of eco-
logical validity when researching lie detection. These findings
also uncover a new potential tool for enhancing lie detection
in real-world scenarios.
Keywords Human factors . Judgment and decisionmaking .
Social cognition . Attention . Executive control
Due to increases in the number of terrorist attacks internation-
ally this century (Global Terrorism Database, 2016), security
concerns have becomemore prevalent. Events and venues that
attract large crowds are targeted to inflict maximum damage
(Morris, 2015). Security checkpoints act as the main bastion
of protection at these events (e.g., at stadiums and transport
hubs), and security personnel are specifically tasked with de-
tecting those with hostile intent trying to pass through security
(e.g., smuggling weapons). However, people, even police of-
ficers and other experts, are quite poor at detecting deception,
with a bias toward assuming that people are telling the truth
(Bond &DePaulo, 2006). Different physiological lie detectors
have been tested as compensatory methods, but they have not
been found sufficiently reliable (Vrij, 2008), nor would they
be able to deal with the large numbers of people passing
through checkpoints.
Response latencies, the time between the end of the ques-
tion and the start of the answer, have been considered a prom-
ising alternative, because this is one of the more consistent
vocal cues to deception (Vrij, 2008). Response latency is con-
sidered a measure of cognitive load, both within the lie detec-
tion literature (e.g., Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001) and in other
psychological fields (e.g., research on driving by Lamble,
Kauranen, Laakso, & Summala, 1999). Cognitive load can
also be measured by means of a secondary task. Several forms
of the detection response task have been used—for example,
during driving simulations (Bruyas & Dumont, 2013)—and a
similar tactile task has been used for lie detection in a labora-
tory setting (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, &Waller, 2013). However,
secondary tasks have not yet been used in lie detection studies
that aim for higher ecological validity, since these tasks are not
in general use in applied settings. Response latency is a
cognitive-load cue that is automatically present in any inter-
view, and therefore is more attractive for use in real life.
Deception creates cognitive load, since individuals must
inhibit their true memories while simultaneously fabricating
a fictitious account. This increased load in liars then causes
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them to respond more slowly to questions. However, several
other theories about deception also make predictions about
response latencies (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). The
attempted-control theory, which holds that liars try to imitate
truth tellers as much as they can, suggest that liars could show
shorter latencies. If liars believe that long latencies are a cue to
deception, they may try to deliberately answer as quickly as
possible. This hypothesis assumes that they are capable of
doing so while also handling high cognitive load (Sporer &
Schwandt, 2006). However, little if any support for this hy-
pothesis has been found.
Sporer and Schwandt’s (2006) meta-analysis of paraverbal
cues to deception showed that liars indeed showed longer
response latencies. However, the effect size was relatively
small (d = 0.18, p = .004), and the effect sizes were very het-
erogeneous across studies. The response latency effect was
also affected by several moderators. The differences between
truth tellers and liars were larger when people were discussing
their feelings and facts than when they were only discussing
facts. Giving participants time to prepare their statement re-
duced the difference between truth tellers and liars to
nonsignificance, whereas motivating participants to do well
increased it. The effect of response latency was larger in stud-
ies using within-subjects designs than in studies using
between-subjects designs. Sporer and Schwandt concluded
that the meta-analysis of response latencies supported the
cognitive-load model and not the attempted-control model.
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis showed a smaller effect
size for response latency (d = 0.02), but agreed on the high
heterogeneousness of the studies in this area. Like Sporer
and Schwandt, they found that the difference between truth
tellers’ and liars’ response latencies was affected by prepara-
tion. In unplanned deception tasks, liars’ latencies tended to be
longer, but for planned deception, this effect was reduced.
These findings are reflected in people’s beliefs about laten-
cy as a deception cue. Hartwig and Bond’s (2011) meta-
analysis showed that people associate an increase in latency
with deception (r = .18). Colwell et al. (2006) studied US po-
lice officers and found that 65% of them believed that re-
sponse latencies increase in liars telling spontaneous lies,
26% believed that liars had shorter latencies, and 14% be-
lieved there was no difference. Colwell et al. also found that,
for planned lies, police officers were more divided: 38% be-
lieved liars had shorter latencies, whereas 37% believed liars
had longer latencies, and 24% said there was no difference.
However, the situations in which we are interested in iden-
tifying deception differ drastically from the artificial,
laboratory-based situations that were used in most studies in
these meta-analyses. In such studies, participants are often
asked to lie about arbitrary stimuli presented on a desktop
display (e.g., Sheridan & Flowers, 2010; Vendemia, Buzan,
& Green, 2005) or in response to open-ended questions from
an innocuous research assistant (e.g., Walczyk, Mahoney,
Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). At security checkpoints,
however, security personnel typically ask questions that re-
quire short answers or a yes/no response—for example,
BDid you pack your own bag?^ (Transport Security
Administration, 2016). Unlike in laboratory studies, the ques-
tions usually are personally relevant to the responder in that
particular situation. In these situations, both the questioner and
the responder know the Bright answer,^ since the responder is
aware that admitting to illegal acts is likely to lead to delay or
arrest. Cognitive load may be lower in such a situation, since
there is no need for the participant to actively remember their
answers, which is necessary to maintain consistency between
the answers in open-ended interview questions. This is one of
the reasons that lying is considered more cognitively loading
than truth telling (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). At the
same time, this paradigm requires speech and social contact,
in a way that computer tasks do not. This could mean that
cognitive load is increased when compared to laboratory
tasks, because the participant is likely to monitor and attempt
to control their behaviors and expressions to look truthful
(Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). This is not necessary when
completing a computer task. It is also likely that arousal is
increased in a task that includes a social interaction, as com-
pared to a computer task (Rauch, Strobel, Bella, Odachowski,
& Bloom, 2014).
With recent advances in virtual reality (VR) technology, we
can now create realistic, immersive environments that individ-
uals experience as similar to their counterparts in the real
world, even in forensic settings (Benbouriche, Nolet,
Trottier, & Renaud, 2014; Mertens & Allen, 2007), and that
are far superior to desktop displays (Sanchez-Vives & Slater,
2005). Using VR, we conducted an experiment to assess
whether the findings of increased deceptive response latencies
generalize to questions posed by a security checkpoint officer
in a realistic virtual environment (VE)—specifically, an air-
port security checkpoint. If the cognitive-load theory general-
izes to these real-world scenarios, we should expect liars to
take longer to respond. However, if these types of real-world
scenarios reduce cognitive load, other factors, such as arousal
or attempted control, may lead to no difference, or even to
faster response times for liars than for truth tellers.
Method
Participants
Forty undergraduate students from Lancaster University were
recruited to take part in this study, using opportunity sampling
and the Lancaster University participant pool (32 female, eight
male;Mage = 19.18, SDage = 2.76). All participants were native
or fluent English speakers. All had normal or corrected-to-
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normal vision to participate in the VR scenario, and all pro-
vided informed consent.
Design
For the study we used a 2 (Deception) by 2 (Question Type)
by 8 (Question) mixed design. The deception variable was
varied between subjects: Half of the participants’ bags
contained nonrestricted as well as restricted items, which they
were instructed to lie about (deception condition). The other
participants’ bags contained all nonrestricted items
(nondeception condition). The questions type variable was
varied within subjects: Half of the questions required those
in the deception condition to lie (experimental questions),
but they responded truthfully to the others (control questions).
In the nondeception condition, participants responded truth-
fully to all 16 questions. Question was also a within-subjects
variable: All participants were asked eight questions per ques-
tion type. The dependent measure was the response latency—
the time between the end of the question and the start of the
answer. Responses were recorded using Audacity software,
which allowed for millisecond precision. We also assessed
immersion using a standard immersion questionnaire (Slater,
Usoh, & Steed, 1994).
Apparatus and stimuli
The study was conducted in a quiet room. The laptop running
the VR program was placed on a table, enabling the oculus
external tracker to be at eye level when participants were
seated. The head-mounted display (HMD) used was the
Oculus DK2, which provided both position and orientation
tracking of head movements.
Backpack An empty backpack was provided for participants
to pack specific items, depending on their assigned condition.
These items included the items prohibited through airport se-
curity—a large bottle of liquid, a hammer, scissors, and lighter
fluid—as well as the control items—a chocolate bar, a pair of
glasses in their case, a box of paracetamol, a t-shirt, and a
notebook. This aspect of the experiment, packing a bag with
items about which the deception questions were asked, was
adapted from Mullins et al. (2014).
VR airport A 3-D model of an empty industrial building was
used to simulate the airport security VE, using the Unity3D
software program. Objects typically found at airport security
checkpoints, such as a metal detector and baggage X-ray ma-
chine, were put into this empty room. A stationary, armed
airport security guard avatar was also present in the airport
environment. The security guard avatar had his mouth cov-
ered throughout, so as to avoid issues with mouth movements
not properly corresponding with the questions being asked.
The security guard was also carrying a rifle, in an attempt to
counteract the difficulty of mimicking the imposing atmo-
sphere of real airport security checkpoints in this VR scenario.
The VE was displayed through an HMD (Oculus DK2),
which also had tracking technology enabled, allowing for par-
ticipants’ head movements to correspond with visual changes
in the VE.
Interview Using text-to-speech technology, a set of 16 ques-
tions, comprising eight control questions and eight experi-
mental questions (see Table 1), were programmed to emanate
from the security guard avatar. The control questions elicited a
truthful response from all participants, whereas the experi-
mental questions elicited a deceptive response from those in
the deception condition and a truthful response from the con-
trols. The response latencies to the 16 interview questions
were measured in milliseconds, from when the question had
been uttered in full by the security avatar in VR to the moment
that the participant began to respond.
These questions were adapted from those in Mullins et al.
(2014), with the aim of mimicking questions that might be
realistically asked in an airport scenario. The number of ques-
tions was increased to 16, in order to obtain more robust data.
Increasing the number of questions further would not be do-
able in an interview setting, where normally relatively few
questions are asked; for example, the cognitive interview uses
only four main questions, with the possibility of elaboration





C Are you currently a student?
C Did you pack your bag yourself?
C Are you carrying any food items?
C Does your bag contain any electrical equipment?
C Are you travelling on your own?
C Do you have any explosives in your bag?
C Are you carrying any tobacco products?
C Are we currently in an airport?
E Does your bag contain any prohibited items?
E Does your bag contain any large quantities of liquids?
E Are all the items in your bag within the travel guidelines?
E Do you have any lighters or flammable liquids in your
possession?
E Are you sure there are no restricted items in your bag?
E Are you carrying any sharp objects?
E Are you carrying any items which could be used to harm
someone?
E Are you in possession of any tools or other dangerous
items?
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(Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). A second laptop was
used to capture participants’ verbal responses, using the audio
software program Audacity.
Immersion questionnaire A presence questionnaire (see
Appendix A) requiring responses to participants’ experience
in the airport environment was administered. Six of the seven
questions used a 7-point Likert scale, whereas the final, open-
ended question required a general response that (1) helped
enhance the realistic nature of the airport environment for
future experiments, but (2) reduced the realism of the scenario.
The open-ended question was merely used to gauge partici-
pants’ experiences, to improve the scenario in the future. The
answers from this question were not included in the immer-
sion analysis. The overall scores, which were calculated from
the sum of the six Likert responses, were used to measure
participants’ immersion in the VR environment.
This questionnaire was adapted from a similar immersion
questionnaire developed by Slater, Usoh, and Steed (1994), to
see whether there was a difference in the level of immersion,
depending on condition.
Procedure
After going through the informed-consent procedure, partici-
pants packed the bag with the items they were to take through
the VE. Participants then donned the HMD and were im-
mersed in a VE resembling an airport security checkpoint,
complete with metal detectors and baggage scanners (see
Fig. 1). Each participant was tested individually. They were
first given a written brief, depending on their condition,
informing them of the items that they would be given to pack
for their airplane journey. Following this, the participants were
presented with the items that they were to pack, and were
given the same instructions verbally to explicitly specify
which of the items were prohibited and which were not (if
applicable), to ensure that they understood their task.
Following this, participants then packed the backpack with
these items (see Table 2). The HMD was then placed on the
participant’s head, and he or she was immersed in the airport
VE (see Fig. 1). Participants were then asked a set of 16
questions, in random order, while they were in VR and situ-
ated directly in front of the security guard avatar, and they
gave verbal Byes^ or Bno^ responses to each individual ques-
tion. After answering all of the questions, the participants
exited the VE and filled in the immersion questionnaire.
Results
Trials on which participants did not respond, answered
the question incorrectly, or did not hear/understand the
question were removed from the analysis, which
accounted for 2.6% of the data. One participant’s data
were removed due to immersion scores that were –4
SDs from the mean. Another participant’s data were
not included due to a technical error with recovering
the recorded data; thus, their immersion responses were
not used. Immersion scores were quite high, M = 26.87,
SD = 5.58, and did not differ between conditions,
p = .410.
We conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance,
with condition as the between-subjects variable (control vs.
deception), questions type (control vs. experimental) and
question number (eight questions per type) as within-
subjects variables, and response latency as the dependent mea-
sure. Neither the main effect of question type (p = .052) nor
that of deception condition (p = .525) was significant.
However, the Question Type × Condition interaction was sig-
nificant, F(1, 37) = 4.83, p = .034, ηp
2 = .12; see Fig. 2. To
assess whether the difference between the control and exper-
imental questions could be a cue to deception, we conducted
paired-samples t tests for the deceptive and nondeceptive
groups, with question type as the within-subjects variable
and mean latency as the dependent measure. For the deception
condition, we found that the mean response latency scores
were significantly longer for the control questions, M = 0.95,
SD = 0.23, than for the experimental questions, M = 0.84,
SD = 0.16, t(20) = 2.82, p = .011, d = 0.61; see Fig. 2. For the
control condition, the mean response latency scores wereFig. 1 A screenshot of the virtual environment used in the study
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similar for control questions,M = 0.93, SD = 0.18, and exper-
imental questions, M = 0.93, SD = 0.18, p = .89.
For completeness, we directly compared the response
latencies to the experiment and control questions be-
tween the deception and nondeception groups.
Experimental question response latencies in the decep-
tion group were not significantly different from the con-
trol question response latencies in the nondeception
group, t(37) = –1.62, p = .11, nor were the experimental
question response latencies in the deception group sig-
nificantly different from those latencies in the
nondeception group, t(37) = –1.69, p = .099. This lack
of differences was likely due to power, because the
significant difference between the experimental and con-
trol questions in the deceptive group was a within-
subjects comparison, whereas these t tests were per-
formed between subjects. However, the within-subjects
comparison was what could be used as a cue to
deception in applied settings, not the group-level com-
parison. Therefore, the lack of significance at the group
level was of less interest.
Discussion
The results were opposite to those in the previous liter-
ature: Liars showed shorter latencies when lying.
Interestingly, liars did not respond faster than truth
tellers overall. Liars only responded more quickly when
they were lying, whereas truth tellers responded equally
quickly to both groups of questions. These results sug-
gest that in this ecologically valid scenario, liars answer
more quickly when lying, not more slowly, as has pre-
viously been thought. Additionally, because no differ-
ence was found between the latencies of the experimen-
tal and control questions in truth tellers, we can be
reasonably sure that these results are not merely a con-
sequence of the difference in content between the ex-
perimental and control questions.
These findings may mean that in an airport setting,
the cognitive-load aspect of lying is not as prominent as
it is in laboratory situations. Because the Bright answer^
is known, the cognitive load induced by passing
through a security check is likely lower for both truth
tellers and liars than is answering the types of questions
used in laboratory settings. The added cognitive load of
lying is also reduced, because there is no need to ac-
tively create a new answer. This overall reduction in
cognitive load, plus the reduction in load added by ly-
ing, likely means that the difference between truth
tellers and liars in cognitive load is close to eliminated.
However, this only explains why liars are not slower
than truth tellers, not why liars are faster when lying
It could be that this reduction in response latencies
is an effect of arousal or fear. In a more ecologically
valid situation in which they are being questioned by
Table 2 Items packed by the control and deception groups
Group
Control Deception
Group-specific items Box of painkillers Large bottle of liquid
T-shirt Hammer
Notebook Flammable liquid
Pair of gloves Scissors
Shared items (control and deception groups) Pair of glasses Chocolate bar
Fig. 2 Response latencies across different conditions and question types.
Between-subjects error bars represent ±1 SE
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an imposing figure, participants might experience
more arousal or fear. Greater arousal is associated
with faster response times in non-lie-detection fields
of psychology (Eason & Harter, 1969), although this
has not been consistently agreed upon within lie de-
tection (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). However, if indi-
viduals answer questions more quickly when aroused,
then one would expect that participants would have
answered all of the questions more quickly, not only
the questions on which they were being deceptive.
However, liars only responded more quickly when ly-
ing, so it is unlikely that the faster responses were due
to increased arousal.
Alternatively, liars’ faster latencies may be a result of
them either consciously or subconsciously responding
more quickly when lying, to appear more confident in
an attempt to deceive the officer. The main point
supporting this interpretation is the finding that liars
are only faster when lying. If liars were trying to be
as fast as possible in order to appear more confident
when engaging in deception, they would likely do so
only for those questions. This decrease in response la-
tencies could possibly also be an unconscious strategy.
The response latencies were all under 1 s, and were
even lower when participants engaged in deception.
Therefore, it is unlikely that participants had time to
deliberately contemplate answering more quickly to only
the questions they answered deceptively, while answer-
ing less quickly to questions they answered truthfully.
One possibility is that hearing a question in which one
must answer deceptively triggers an impulse to respond
as quickly as possible, especially for yes/no questions
that the liar is anticipating. Future research should dif-
ferentiate between the conscious and unconscious mech-
anisms. Following increased investigation, these findings
may show a potentially powerful tool in deception
detection.
Interestingly, the majority of the lie detection litera-
ture has shown longer response latencies, but only
when lying about arbitrary stimuli and using open-
ended responses. These results highlight the notion that
certain cues to deception do not provide a Bone size
fits all^ solution. The context and types of questions
matter in terms of how people engage in deception.
Perhaps these differences as a consequence of context
and question type are some of the reasons why the
research on deception detection has been so divided.
Likely, reliable cues to deception exist, but different
cues are used that depend on the task and environment.
Thus, for research on deception to be useful, it should
focus on investigating cues to deception in the explicit
scenario and on the types of questions in the environ-
ment of interest.
A second area of future research should be expansion
of the use of VR in lie detection research. Our findings
that participants experienced high immersion and that
truth tellers and liars did so equally mean that VR
may be a solution to the problem of ecological validity
in lie detection research. This problem is longstanding
and well-known, but so far there has been little progress
on a solution (see, e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003). VR
would be a way for researchers to have the realistic
environments needed, as well as having the experimen-
tal control that laboratory studies offer. In fact, VR al-
lows researchers to have even more control than in most
laboratory studies, because VR allows them to fully
control each movement and word by the interviewer,
which is an impossibility for interviewers in the real
world. Using VR would also substantially reduce the
cost of setting up realistic environments and realistic
action tasks. Although VR might solve part of the eco-
logical validity problem, it cannot address the lack-of-
motivation problem. In real life, someone trying to
smuggle illegal items through a security checkpoint
faces arrest, a prison sentence, and possibly a violent
confrontation. VR cannot replicate these very real dan-
gers, and if it could, it would not be ethical to use it.
However, VR may be the closest that we can get to
replicating these situations.
Our research has uncovered a new, potentially useful
cue to deception. Additionally, our results call into ques-
tion the generalizability of previous research on response
latencies as a cue to deception. They highlight the im-
portance of ecological validity when researching lie de-
tection, and uncover a new potential tool for enhancing
lie detection in real-world scenarios.
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Virtual Reality Immersion Questionnaire
1. Rate your sense of being at the security checkpoint, on the following scale from 1 to 7, where 7 
represents your normal experience of being in a place.
I had a sense of “being there” in the security checkpoint:
1                        2                       3                       4                        5                       6  7
Not at all                                                                                              Very much
2. To what extent were there times during the experience when the security checkpoint was the 
reality for you?
There were times during the experience when the checkpoint was the reality for me...
1         2                       3                       4                        5                       6                        7
At no time                                                                                                                   
3. When you think back about your experience, do you think of the security checkpoint more as 
images that you saw, or more as somewhere that you visited?
The security checkpoint seems to me to be more like...
1                        2                       3                       4                        5                       6  7
Images that 
I saw                                                                                                                        
4. During the time of the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your sense of being at the
security checkpoint, or of being elsewhere?
I had a stronger sense of...
1                        2                       3                       4                        5                       6  7
Being elsewhere                                                                                                              Being there                    
5. Consider your memory of being at the security checkpoint. How similar in terms of the structure of 
the memory is this to the structure of the memory of other places you have been today? By ‘structure 
of the memory’ consider things like the extent to which you have a visual memory of the checkpoint, 
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